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Dynamic Behavior of Imperfectly Competitive
Economies with Multiple Equilibria
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the dynamic behavior of an economy with multiple
Nash equilibria.The first part of the paper analyzes an abstract game
exhibiting multiple equilibria. A history dependent selection criterion is
proposed which induces correlated behavior in equilibrium even though agents
are playing one-shot gaines and disturbances are not correlated over time.
The second part of the paper investigates a specific model of multiple
equilibria.Here the multiplicity is induced by the presence of a discrete
decision on the part of firms regarding their choice of technique.The
implications of the selection criterion introduced in the first part of the
paper are illustrated through this example. Again correlated behavior
emerges in a sequence of independent one-shot games. The model economy may
also experience prolonged periods in which a low productivity technology is
in use and then, as a consequence ofa large real disturbance, may switch to
an alternative equilibrium in which a high productivity technology is






Formalization of the Keynesian notion of coordination failures has led to
the design of model economies with multiple Nash equilibria which are Pareto
rankable.In the presence of multiple Nash equilibria, the economy can
become "stuck" at an equilibrium which is Pareto dominated by another
equilibrium. Yet, agents have no reason to alter their behavior since their
actions are best responses to the actions of other players.
Coordination failures of this .type are not possible in a Wairasian model
with perfectly competitive markets and flexible wages and prices.They
emerge in models which limit the coordinating powers of the auctioneer by
either fixing some prices, allowing imperfect competition or postulating a
technology for matching traders.
Model economies displaying this coordination failure property were
exhibited by Diamond [1982], Heller [1986], Howitt [1985], Kiyotaki [1985],
Roberts [1984,1986] and Cooper-John [1986]. Diamond's results derive from a
model in which markets are replaced by a random matching mechanism. Agents
perceive that their chances of trading depends on the number of other agents
producing in any period.Hence, many conjectures on the number of other
agents producing in a given period can be fulfilled in equilibrium.Many
times, there is one equilibrium with low output and employment which is
Pareto dominated by another with high output and employment. Howitt
introduces costs of trading which depend on the level of activity in the
economy to generate similar results.
The other papers introduce imperfect competition into a multi-sector
economy.The feedback effects between agents are then brought about by the
normality of consumption goods in demand functions. Heller [1986] shows that2
one can construct economies with multiple equilibria by varying the
properties of demand functions. The results reported by Kiyotaki and Cooper-
John place emphasis on the importance of technological factors in generating
multiple equilibria. As in Diamond's model, these equilibria can be Pareto
ranked by the level of economic activity. Cooper-John also discusses the
connection between these models of imperfect competition and Diamond's model
of search.
One of the potential drawbacks to this line of inquiry is that the
presence of multiple equilibria weakens the predictive power of these models.
In particular, conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria, do not
provide insights into which of the equilibria is more or less likely to be
observed.In fact, it is often argued that the Pareto dominant equilibrium
provides a natural focal point and hence is likely to be the outcome of a
game with multiple Nash equilibria.Acceptance of this claim invalidates
multiple equilibrium theories of coordination failures.
This paper discusses an approach to selecting an equilibrium allocation
which does not rest on the presumption that the Pareto optimal equilibrium is
a focal point.1The argument advanced here is that historical experience
generates a focal point. If the economy has been at a particular equilibrium
in the past, then as the fundamental characteristics of the economy change,
the new equilibrium is likely to be near the old one. More generally, as the
economy varies due to small disturbances, it is natural to think that the
equilibrium outcomes will respond by moving to an equilibrium which is
"close." Using techniques of regular economies (discussed below), there will
generically exist equilibria close to a given equilibrium point for small
disturbances to the economy. Thus, generically, one can perform these local3
comparative statics and apply this selection criterion.
This intuition is made specific in the context of a general model of
strategic interactions. A selection hypothesis is advanced to determine the
equilibrium from the set of equilibria. When this hypothesis is used to
select among equilibria, the path of the economy is dependent on historical
experience. This general approach is discussed in Section II.
Using a variant of the multiple equilibrium example proposed in Cooper-
John, this paper traces the implications of this selection hypothesis for the
observed time series of this economy.The results imply that correlated
output movements can be generated using this selection criterion even though
individuals in the economy are playing one-shot games and the shocks to the
economy are uncorrelated over time.In this environment, it is also shown
that small changes in "policy variables" may have large effects as the
economy passes through a critical point. That is, policy (interpreted as a
variation of the parameters of the game) may have "catastrophic effects."
In addition to being useful for exhibiting this selection criterion, the
example analyzed in Section III may be interesting in its own right as a
source of multiplicity. The example rests on firms choosing both a
production technology (or the number of plants to operate) and the level of
output. The introduction of this discrete technology choice is the source of
the multiplicity and the basis for the inertial behavior.
II. A General Approach
To provide a framework for the analysis, consider a game between I
identical agents indexed by il,2 I. Each agent selects a variable, e.,
to maximize U(e.,e.,r) where e. refers to the vector of actions taken by
the other agents, rEr is an index of the game that these agents are playing4
and F is the set of possible games.Assume that U() is continuously
differentiable and concave in e..Suppose that eE [O,W] where O<WER is the
largest feasible action for agent i. Thus the strategy space is compact and
convex.When agent i selects action e and e.= e for j7'i, the utility of
agent i is denoted U(e.,e,r). The function is the utility maximizing
choice of agent i if all other agents select action e in the game r. That
is,
3U(e. ,e,r) 1 =0ate. =4(e,r).
8 e.
1
The set of Nash equilibria for the game r is E(r) where
E(r) =(el qS(e,r) =e).
Our interest is in the relationship between r and the set E(r). For that
analysis, the techniques of global analysis of smooth economies will be quite
useful. To use these techniques, it is necessary to assume TJ()is
continuously differentiable. The continuous differentiability of payoffs is
an assumption often made in this literature and can be defended by noting
that in the space of preferences, for any utility function not satisfying
this assumption, there will exist a utility function which is continuously
differentiable "close by".The assumption that the strategy space is an
interval ensures that the techniques for smooth economies can be used in this
analysis.
These assumptions will allow us to explore the properties of E(r). First,
does there exist an equilibrium? The set E(r) will be non-empty for all r if5
li 4(e,r) > 0 and li 'Z(e,r)<W.
These restrictions imply that if all other agents in theeconomy choose
values of e close to 0, then the best response of the remaining agent will be
to provide a positive level of effort. If all other agents select a level of
effort close to W, the best response of the remaining agent is to produce
less. These conditions, which are analogous to the boundary assumptions used
in competitive analysis, along with the continuity and curvature assumptions
on U() will imply the existence of an interior symmetric Nash equilibrium.
(Hence we can work with the open strategy space of (0,W)).
There may, in fact, be multiple equilibria for some r.A necessary
condition for multiple symmetric Nash equilibria is for to be
increasing in e for a given r.That is, if all other agents provide more
effort, it is in the interest of the remaining agent to supply more effort as
well. This is the condition called strategic coniplementarity in Bulow-
Geanokoplos-Kiemperer [1985] and used extensively in Cooper-John [1986].
To understand the correspondence E(r), Figure 1 provides a heuristic graph
of E(r)X r.This is often termed the equilibrium manifold in the literature
on smooth economies. Any point on the manifold represents a combination of a
game r and a level of effort, eE(O,W), for all agents such that eeE(r). The
projection from the equilibrium manifold to r is often termed the Debreu
mapping
There are a number of important properties of the equilibrium manifold
worth noting.First, for all r except r1 and r2, the set of equilibria
contains an odd number of elements. The gamesr1 and are called critical6
games. The likelihood that the economy would ever be at such a game is zero.
Call games that are not critical, regular. Second, note that the number of
equilibria is constant in the neighborhood of a regular game.This second
property is derived from applying the inverse function theorem to the Debreu
mapping.Third, for a regular game r*, there will exist k continuously
differentiable functions such that the equilibria of any game r in the
neighborhood of r* are given by these functions evaluated at r. The second
and third properties are stated formally in Debreu [1970].For fairly
general games, Van Damme [1983] provides a proof that (i) Nash equilibria are
regular for almost all normal form games (ii) that the regular equilibria are
locally unique and (iii) the number of equilibria is odd.
For a regular game, these properties imply a type of a local comparative
statics result in that it is possible to alter the game a little around a
regular game and obtain a prediction about the outcome in the new game given
the equilibrium in the original game. That is, if e is the symmetric Nash
equilibrium for game 'r, then the equilibrium e' would be the equilibrium
selected for game r' in Figure 2.
This local comparative statics result implies a selection criterion which
is history dependent.That is, it specifies a process for selecting an
equilibrium out of E(r) which depends on the history of the game.This
process seems quite reasonable and desirable since one would imagine that
small variations in the characteristics of an economy would not alter the
equilibrium prediction very much.
The analysis which follows is an attempt to look at the dynamics of an
economy (or game) in which this local comparative statics property is
employed as a selection device.That is, consider a sequence of one shot7
games where the game that is actually chosen in period t,r, is random.
Then given a criterion for selecting eEE(r), the distribution over r will
induce a distribution over the set of equilibria.Our interest is in
understanding the properties of this mapping and its relation to our proposed
selection criterion.
The selection criterion extends the intuition for the local comparative
statics result to more general variations in the game. For small variations
in r, if is in the neighborhood of then e+iEE(r+1) will be in the
neighborhood of eEE(r).So once we knowe, this criterion predicts an
equilibrium in period t+l for close to r. For larger variations in
r, this local selection criterion needs to be extended.We say that two
equilibria are on the same path if there is a continuous selection out of the
equilibrium correspondence connecting them. So, in considering two games, if
e is the equilibrium for r, and e+1er+1 and there is a path connecting e
and e÷i, then e+1 will be the equilibrium outcome forr÷i. Thus and
need not be close to one another in order to employ this selection
criterion.
This proposed criterion rests on a number of arguments advanced in the
literature.First, the local comparative statics results noted above seem
quite reasonable so that for sufficiently small variations in r, the solution
should move locally. This effect alone generates some history dependence in
the outcome through the effect of historical experience on the conjectures
agents hold about the behavior of others in the game.
Second, the tracing procedure advocated by Harsanyi [1975] would support
this selection criterion as well. The tracing procedure starts byspecifying
priors for each players about the strategies of other players.The best8
responses by players for these priors provides an initial vectorof actions.
The tracing procedure then selects an equilibrium by moving along a path from
this initial vector of actions to the set of equilibria for the given game as
the weight agents place on their initial priors decreases.According to
Harsanyi, this process occurs through introspection on the part of the
players. In our setting, the equilibrium in the previous period would provide
the starting point for the tracing procedure which would then select an
equilibrium along the path.
Third, one could rationalize (a variant of) this selection process through
a local stability argument.2 As discussed by Furth [1986] in the context of
oligopoly models, one can specify a simple dynamical system which describes
changes in the actions of the players as a function of the vector of
strategies chosen by all players. This is taken to describe the adjustment
process of agents out of equilibrium.Using this approach, the selection
criterion proposed above can be interpreted as stating that the economy moves
along a path linking locally stable equilibria. So, as long as the analysis
begins with an economy on a locally stable branch of the equilibrium
manifold, as the game varies, the equilibrium will simply move along that
same branch.
Finally, suppose that in the economy there exists a group of agents who
behaved in a non-responsive manner or inertial manner in that they did not
vary decisions for small changes in the environment (see the discussionin
Akerlof-Yellen [1985] and Haltiwanger-Waldman [1985]). In the presence of
these agents, other, more responsive, agents in the game will be led to
conjecture that the economy will not vary much in the presence of shocks and
this will support the selection criterion advocated in this paper. This will9
hold even as the proportion of "inertial" agents becomes small.
For sufficiently large changes in r, the set of equilibria may change
dramatically and branches may disappear.In this case, the economy has
undergone a catastrophe in that the game has passed through a critical point
and the selection criterion proposed above may not give a precise prediction.
In Figure 2, if the economy goes from r to r' then the selection criterion
will select e'. However, if the economy goes from r to r", the equilibrium
is not determined by our selection criterion since there is no path linking e
to any eEE(r").In this event, a jump in the economy will occur and we are
without a precise prediction about the outcome.
The selection criterion proposed here generates a stochastic difference
equation to specify the equilibrium outcome. Since history provides a focal
point in selecting the equilibrium, the outcomes in this economy will exhibit
some serial correlation. How are the initial conditions for this equation
specified? These conditions are determined by periods in which the economy
has a unique outcome. So, in Figure 1, if the economy is to the "left" of
or to the "right" of r2, there is an unique prediction. When r lies between
these two critical games, then the equilibrium prediction depends on the
equilibrium that was selected in the previous play of the game.
Finally, it should be noted that one can interpret variations in r as a
consequence of policy actions by a government which moves before the agents
in the economy. I.e. the government picks the game that the private agents
subsequently play.The effects of "policy" on this economy depends on
whether the policy alters the economy locally or causes a catastrophe. So
small variations in policy variables will alter the equilibrium outcome a
little while large policy changes can cause dramatic effects on allocations.10
Thus characterizing policy effects from local measures of agents decisions
rules will be helpful only as guidance on the effects of small policy
changes.
III. Multiple Equilibria and the Choice of Technique
To make this discussion a bit more concrete, this section analyzes a
simple production economy exhibiting multiple equilibria and uses this
structure to display some of the time series properties noted above. The
multiplicity of equilibria in this example is related to that in Cooper-John
[1986] in that firms have a choice of production techniques which differ by
their fixed and marginal costs.In Cooper-John, this was interpreted as a
choice of the number of shifts to run a plant. As in Kiyotaki as well, the
multiplicity studied here derives from technological features as opposed to
the structure of demands utilized in }ieller.
Consider an economy with three traded commodities. Two of these
commodities are produced by firms and the third is endowed to a group of
agents termed outsiders. These outsiders have an aggregate endowment of 2M
which is spent equally on each of the two produced goods. In what follows,
variations in kwillbe the source of fluctuations in this economy.
Assume that there are F firms in each of two sectors, indexed i=l,2
producing the two other commodities.The nuniber of firms is taken as given
and is assumed to be finite so that the quantity decisions of firms have non-
negligible effects on the prices in their sectors of activity.
Firms in sector 1 are assumed to be consumers of sector 2 output and the
non-produced good. For simplicity, assume that these firms have Cobb-
Douglas preferences over these two commodities with the budget share of




Here n denotes time spent at work and this must be less than or equal to the
time endowment of these agents. In the analysis that follows we will ignore
this constraint and focus on interior equilibria.
Sector 1 firms select both a level of output and a technology.In
particular, suppose that firms choose between two techniques having
associated cost functions C3(q) =K.+q/O.for j=L,H. Assume that KH > KL
and that 9H >0LSo the H technology is more productive but requires a
larger fixed cost to operate. These two technologies could be interpreted as
totally independent ways of producing a particular commodity and each period
firms must decide on the appropriate techniques. Alternatively, firms must
decide on the number of shifts for the operation of their plants. Operating
with one shift has a lower fixed cost but is less productive than operating
with two shifts.
Letting R(q) denote the revenues earned by producing q units of output,
the indirect utility for a sector 1 firm using technique j is
aa(la) (l/p2)aR(q) -C3(q) (2)
Here the price in sector 2 enters into the indirect utility gained from the
revenues earned in producing good 1. Let12
aa(la)(1/p2)a
Firms in sector 2 are endowed with time which they devote to producing
commodity 2. The cost of producing a unit of output is k<1 units of leisure.
These firms also have Cobb-Douglas preferences with the budget share of
sector 1 output also being a and the remainder of revenues spent on the non-
produced commodity.The indirect utility from producing q units of output
for sector 2 firms in then given by
-kq (4)
where (p1) is defined in an analogous fashion to
Multiple equilibria may emerge in this economy because of the presence of
a choice of technique for the sector 1 firms. If all but one sector 1 firm
is using technique H, then prices in the economy will be relatively low and
the remaining firm may find it worthwhile to pay the extra fixed cost to
operate the more productive technology as well.Alternatively, if all but
one firm is using the less productive technology, then prices in the economy
will be higher and the returns to producing more for the remaining firm
lower.As a consequence, it may not pay the remaining firm to utilize the
more productive technology so that an equilibrium with all firms using the
less productive technology can emerge as well.3
Note that an important element in this discussion is the interaction
between the choice of technology and the prices of the produced goods. Since
firms are consumers of the commodities produced in other sectors, their13
return to working depend on the prices of the goods they consume --thisis
captured by (p.) for il,2 in the expressions above.So the gains to
increased production depends on the choice of technique by other firms
through the effect of technique on the price level.Since prices, as
demonstrated below, are mark-ups over unit costs, the choice of technique is
reflected in prices economy-wide.
To characterize the equilibrium for this economy, we focus on the game
played by the firms in both sectors. The sector two firms simply select a
level of output for given conjectures about the output decisions of the other
firms in their sector and the output technology choices by the sector one
firms. Sector one firms select technologies and output levels given
conjectures about the decisions of the other firms in the economy.In
equilibrium, these conjectures are correct. Since all firms within a sector
are identical, we will concentrate on symmetric equilibria within each of the
two sectors. Note that, as in Hart [1982], firms are viewed as having market
power in their product market but act as price takers as consumers.




In this expression, q is the output level for this arbitrary firm and Q is
the output levels for other firms.E2 is the level of expenditure on sector
2 from firms in sector 1 and the outsiders. The superscript j for the sector
1 price indexes the technology used in that sector and is described below in
further detail.The middle expression comes from direct computation of14
marginal revenue for the Cobb-Douglas preferences. The sector 2 output level
in a symmetric Nash equilibrium given E2 and the choice of technique j in
sector 1 is
q =(p)E where ,E(l-l/F) (6)
Using (6) and the condition for equilibrium in sector 2 -- that
expenditures on sector 2 output equals revenues -- yieldsan expression for
the sector 2 price of
p =k/(p) (7)
The optimization problem for sector 1 firms entails a choice of output level
and a technology. To determine an equilibrium, first suppose that all firms
in sector 1 use technique L and select output to maximize utility. Second,
solve for the equilibrium in the economy under this hypothesis about the
choice of technology. Third, check to see whether or not an arbitrary firm
in sector 1 would profit by deviating and producing using the H technology.
If not, then the equilibrium with the L technology is characterized.This
process can be repeated using the H technology at the outset and then
checking deviations to the L technology by an arbitrary firm.
The first order condition for utility maximization for an arbitrary firm
in sector 1 using technology j=H,L is similar to that of the sector 2 firm
specified above. The differences are that ''(p2) replaces (p1) and that the
cost function is that for technology j. Using the superscript j to index the15
common technology, the symmetric Nash equilibrium in sector 1 given the price








Together (7) and (9) determine the prices in the two sectors of the
economy independently of the level of activity in the two sectors. That is,
the equilibrium calculations dichotomize due to the constant marginal costs
and the structure of demand.Equations (6) and (8) can then be used to
determine the equilibrium levels of output in the two sectors. In solving
for the quantity levels, it is necessary to determine the equilibrium levels
of expenditures on each of the two sectors.From the structure of
preferences and the symmetry in the model, the equilibrium level of
expenditures on each sector is
* - 2 -
E=(l-Fa)M/(l-a)=ZM
where kisthe endowment of the outsiders and Z is a constant. Thus, given
that all firms are using technology j=H,L, (6)-(9) completely characterizes
the equilibrium for this economy.
The final check on these conditions is whether a given firm in sector 1
would deviate by altering both its technology and level of output.The
calculations above ensure that a firm would not wish to deviate by altering16
its level of output for the given technology.Suppose that all firms in
sector 1 use technology j, then the equilibrium level of utility for an
arbitrary sector 1 firm is
U1(jlj)= (p )E*/F2 -K. (10)
This level of utility must be compared to that obtained by producing using
the alternative technology,-j.If a single firm deviates and switches




where q3 is the level of output for the deviating firm.
In this condition, the level of expenditure on sector 1 and the price level
in the other sector are taking as given by the firm deviating in sector 1.
The variable Q3 is the level of output by the other firms in sector 1. Since
the deviation under consideration is from a proposed equilibrium, Q3 is
simply (F-1)q where qI is given by (8). Denote by U1(-jj) the utility of
an arbitrary firm in sector 1 from using technology -j when all other firms
in that sector use technology j. Using (11), this is
j*-j -jj 2
U1(-jlj) =(P)E (q / q +Q) -K
(12)









Theleft side of this expression is the difference in fixed costs borne by
a firm using the H instead of the L technology. The right side is the gain
to the firm of using the H technology rather than the L.The term in
brackets is the gain in market share from such a deviation where q is the
level of output by the F-i other firms in the candidate equilibrium and qH is
the output level selected by the deviating firm given by (11). The gains in
market share are then multiplied by the total level of expenditures and then
deflated by the price index.Thus, when (13) holds, there will be an
equilibrium described by (6)- (9) with j.'L --hereaftertermed an L-
equilibrium.
Notethat the likelihood of there being a L-equilibrium depends on the
level of expenditures E* which, from the analysis above, depends on the
aggregate endowment of the non-produced good, M. As M falls, the right side
of (13) falls --theratio of outputs in the bracketed term is independent of
M -- sothat the condition for equilibrium is more likely to be met.
A similar condition is required for the existence of an H-equilibrium. In
order for a firm not to profit by deviating from an H-equilibrium and





F (1 +(F-l)q1/ q
This condition has the gains in terms of reduced fixed costs on the left side18
while the right side is the loss in real income from producing with the L
rather than the H technology. Again, the bracketed term is a measure of the
difference in market share and the other two terms measure the value of the
market share.Since this firm is deviating from the H to the L technology,
it will have a lower market share than the H firms which is balanced by the
reduction in fixed costs. This right side is an increasing function of E*
so that for high levels of M, a H-equilibrium is likely.
To determine conditions under which there will exist multiple equilibria,
let ML be the level of endowment such that (13) holds with equality. So if
M￿ML then an L-equilibriuni will exist. In a similar fashion, set MH so that
(14) holds with equality. Then for M￿MH, an H-equilibrium will exist. If
ML > MB, then there will be a range of valuesof M such that multiple
equilibria exist.Proposition 1 indicates that multiple equilibria are a
possibility in this economy if a is large enough.
Proposition 1: If a is close to 1 then ML>MH.
Proof: See the appendix.
The proof is relegated to the appendix because it is relatively
uninformative. The intuition behind this result is simply that if firms in
sector 1 produce with the H technology, this will induce firms in sector 1
to produce more since the gains to more output are high when the price in
sector 1 is low.From (7) we see that when the sector 1 price is low, so
will be the price in sector 2.From (8) this induces the firms in sector 1
to produce more and makes it more likely, from (14), that they will adopt the
H technology. In a similar fashion, one can describe the L-equilibriuni. For19
both of this equilibrium to exist for the same value of M, decisions by the
firms must be sufficiently responsive to the prices of consumption goods- -
i.e.a must be sufficiently large as required by the proposition.
These equilibria may also be Pareto-ranked for sufficiently large a. Note
that since commodity prices are lower in both sectors in an H-equilibrium,
outsiders are certainly better off when sector 1 firms use the high fixed
cost, high productivity technology.Similarly, sector 2 firms are also
better off since they face lower prices for consumption goods and earn the
same amount of numeraire in the two equilibria. As for sector 1 firms, they
too face lower commodity prices and earn the same amount of numeraire in the
two equilibria.However, they also bear the cost of the setting up the
technology. These costs are outweighed by the gains of lower prices if a is
sufficiently large.
Proposition 2 :If a is sufficiently large, then all agents are better off
in the H-equilibrium than in the L-equilibrium.
Proof: See the appendix.
Suppose, as suggested in the previous section, that we now view repeated
play of this game in which: (i) the firms are only present for a single
period and (ii) the level of endowment of the outsiders, M, is an iid random
variable. The assumption that the firms play only once is used to eliminate
from discussion the possibility of the cooperative outcome supported as a
non-cooperative equilibrium due to repeated play of the game.Note that
because of the multiple equilibrium, this cooperation might develop in finite
play games -- seethe discussion in enoit-Krishna [1985] and Friedman20
[1985]. The assumption that variations in M are uncorrelated is used so that
the observed correlations in output are produced internally.
If the conditions in Proposition 1 hold and multiple equilibria exist,
then we can employ the selection criterion discussed earlier. Suppose that
so that only an L-equilibrium exists in period t.If Mt+lZML, then an
L-equilibrium will exist in period t+1 as well.This is true even if
Mt+l>MH
--i.e.even if an H-equilibrium exists as well.This is the
implication of the selection criterion which states that the equilibrium will
remain on a branch of the equilibrium manifold in period t-i-l if the economy
was there is period t.If Mt+l>ML, then the only possibility is an II-
equilibrium and the economy experiences a catastrophe. In a similar way, one
can describe the implications of there being an H-equilibrium in period t.
The point is that this selection criterion implies correlated behavior in
the economy even in the presence of iid shocks. The persistence is through
the beliefs of the players of this game -- historicalexperience suggests a
focal point to the agents. So bad economic times are likely to persist since
the economy requires a large shock to M in order to move to an H-
equilibrium. Once there, it takes a sufficiently large negative shock to
to bring the economy back to an L-equilibrium.Thus business cycle type
behavior is produced without correlated shocks using this selection
criterion.
IV. Conclusion
This paper proposes a selection criterion for choosing among multiple Nash
equilibria. The crux of the criterion is that agents' conjectures about the
actions chosen by other agents move slowly.If the economy reaches an
equilibrium in period t then agents believe that the equilibrium outcome will21
be close by in period t+l. Actions taken based on these beliefs are correct
in equilibrium.The analysis indicates that this selection criterion can
produce interesting time series in which correlations are produced from
serially independent shocks. As all agents in the model live for a single
period and there is no "capital", these correlations are produced solely from
the beliefs of the agents. The model also is helpful in understanding the
catastrophic effects of large shocks to the system.
The crux of this paper is a selection hypothesis.There are numerous
alternative hypotheses which can produce other outcomes: the selection of the
Pareto dominant equilibrium is one such criterion.4Evaluation of these
selection hypotheses is quite difficult since the focus is on the
unobservable conjectures of players in a game.One possible avenue of
exploration is the construction of simple games in an experimental setting to
evaluate the predictive power of these selection criteria.22
Appendix: Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1






(A2)D= (p)_ [1-[ + F(l-)]2
]
Inthese expressions (OH/OL)½ and is a measure of the gains from switching
technologies in terms of the productivity differentials. To show that ML >
MH,we need to show that
)
(A3) LA>l
where \isthe ratio of the bracketed terms is expressions (Al) and (A2). The
important property of )Listhat it is independent of a. The first term on
the left side of (A3) is the key to the proposition. From the specification
of preferences and the equilibrium conditions (7) and (9) for the sector
specific prices,
H 2 2 (p ) a/1-a
)
Asa-fl, this ratio goes toso that (A3) will hold for a close to 1.23
Proof of Proposition 2
Prices for both produced goods are lower in the H-equilibrium than in the
L-equilibrium as seen from equations (7) and (9). Hence, the outsiders are
better off in the H-equilibrium.Firms in sector 2 are also better off in
the H-equilibrium since they face a lower price for their consumption good
(sector 1 output) and earn the same amount of numeraire in the two equilibria
(given by E*). As for the sector 1 firms, we need to show that
H *2 L *2
(A5) TJ1(HH)= (p2)E/F -K1￿U1(LJL)(p2)E /F -KL.
From (A5), note that the gains to being in an H-equilibrium arise from the
lower prices prevailing in the economy while the gains to the L-equilibrium
derive from the lower fixed cost.The existence of multiple equilibria
requires that U1(HIH)U1(LIH) as given in (10) and (12). Hence a sufficient
condition for sector 1 agents to prefer an H-equilibrium is U1(LIH)￿U1(LIL).
That is, firms are better off using the L technology when others are using
the H technology than when all firms are using the L technology.Using
(10),(ll) and (12), this condition is







As discussed and used in the proof of Proposition 1, the ratio of output
levels (qH/qL) is independent of a.The left side of (A6) is increasing in
a as noted above so that for sufficiently large a, the inequality will hold.
Hence sector 1 firms will also be better off in the H-equilibrium.24
Footnotes
The point is to determine a natural focal point out of the set of
equilibria.The hypothesis stated here is simply that beliefs about the
behavior of others are somewhat inertial in that equilibria that are close by
are more compelling. As an alternative, one might assume that agents believe
in cycles so that these result in equilibrium as discussed by Diamond-
Fudenberg [1986].
2These dynamics should be viewed as introspective as opposed to happening in
real time.Otherwise, we should write down an explicit model of this
adjustment process.See Howitt-McAfee [1986] for a discussion of this
approach.
This externality in the gains of utilizing a more productive technology are
also present in Shleifer [1986] though the technology is taken as given in
this paper.
See the discussion in Harsanyi [1977] for example.25
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